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Chapter 12
Ontologies in the Legal Domain
Laurens Mommers
12.1 Introduction
Ontologies are conceptual models of a specific domain. This use of the term ‘ontol-
ogy’ in the context of computer science and artificial intelligence differs from the
use of the term in a philosophical context (cf. Mommers et al. 1997). Gruber (1993)
defines an ontology as a specification of a conceptualisation, and, more specifically,
as a description of concepts and relations that exist for an individual or a com-
munity of individuals. A conceptualisation is a representation of the world that is
both simplified and abstract (ibid.). In artificial intelligence, ontologies are primar-
ily meant to provide a basic framework for knowledge representation: the entities
and relations distinguished in an ontology provide a user with the means to represent
knowledge in the domain that the ontology covers. Ontologies were considered to
be able to establish the missing link between legal theory and AI & law by Valente
and Breuker (1994).
The rise of ontologies in the domain of artificial intelligence and law (AI & law)
can be seen as both the almost inevitable consequence of developments in computer
science and artificial intelligence in general, and as a recognition of the necessity
of building maintainable, scalable models that do justice to the structure of legal
domains. An inherent problem for legal ontologies, however, is that legal systems
that underlie such ontologies vary according to time and place. The general concepts
and relations of a top-level ontology can rarely accommodate all the peculiarities of
legal systems. In order to address the specific problems bound to appear in legal
ontology building, this chapter provides an (incomplete) overview of ontologies
built in the past decades of AI & law research.
Not all the ontologies discussed were named as such by their creators. We assume
that any model – regardless of its name – that makes implicit or explicit claims
regarding the existence of entity types and relation types amounts to an ontology.
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This chapter also critically assesses the claims of ontologies, it provides an overview
of the tasks attributed to legal ontologies, and it summarizes developments expected
in the near future. For a different overview of legal ontologies and their applications,
please refer to Breuker and Winkels (2003), focusing mainly on a specific set of
projects, but still indicative for the field.
This paper sets out by discussing legal ontologies, classifying them through a
classic distinction between semantics, epistemology and ontology (Section 12.2).
It subsequently discusses the applications of ontologies in the legal domain
(Section 12.3). Then, it continues to explore future opportunities of the applica-
tion of ontologies in legal domains (Section 12.4). Finally, it provides conclusions.
However, we first elaborate on principled problems in building legal ontologies,
arising from the nature of legal domains.
The legal domain is – as many other domains – dominated by the use of nat-
ural language. Although legal language use often has a particularly formal nature,
and contains a lot of jargon, it is still natural language – not the formal kind of
language we find in programming languages or logics. This means that there is
neither a formal syntax nor a formal semantics for legal language. Any attempt
to represent parts of a legal domain will encounter this lack of formal syntax
and semantics, as representation languages require – at least – a formal syn-
tax in order to be usable for automated reasoning, and a formal semantics in
order to disambiguate meaning. The mapping from natural language – by far the
important representation language for legal knowledge – towards (semi-)formal
languages introduces so many principled and practical problems that one could
wonder if building formal representation frameworks actually is a sensible thing
to do.
Principled problems are, first, the nature of natural language meaning in gen-
eral. The revolution that the later Wittgenstein (1953) started in philosophy of
language was the denial of being able to fix natural language meaning in terms
of necessary and sufficient conditions. This revolution has been translated to
the legal domain by, among others, Hart (1961), by introducing the notion of
open texture concepts (cf. also Bix 1991). Modeling a domain almost neces-
sarily assumes a low degree of change if the representation is required to give
a correct picture of that domain. Any changes in the domain have to be mod-
eled to keep the representation up to date. As legal concepts change through
time (they are either replaced by new concepts, or their meaning or interpretation
changes through judicial decisions), their place in the ontology should change as
well.
Second, modeling a domain assumes that a domain can be represented. However,
many branches of legal theory actually concern those acts that ‘mould’ the law:
judicial reasoning for instance, making new ‘things’ (decisions) on the basis of
incomplete information about facts and rules that are not conclusive. Although there
is discussion on the matter whether this problem concerns only hard cases (cf. Hage
et al. 1993, Leenes 1998) – and consequentially, how to establish whether a case is
actually a hard case – the problem will probably always apply to simple cases to a
certain degree.
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Third, representing a legal domain often includes representation of relevant parts
of the ‘real world’. Therefore, legal ontologies generally contain a mix of legal con-
cepts and real-world concepts. There are major differences in the accommodation of
the legal and the legally relevant types in legal ontologies. For instance, McCarty’s
(1989) Language of Legal Discourse (see below) contains largely legally relevant
concepts. Van Kralingen’s (1995) frame-based ontology of law (see below) contains
mostly legal concepts. Mommers’ (2002) knowledge-based ontology of law makes
an explicit distinction between the two types.
Elaborating a bit further on natural language meaning – the first principled prob-
lem stated above – meaning is a subject of major importance to modelling in the
law, as so many legal issues arise from the meaning and interpretation of natural
language terms and sentences. In this respect, some logico-philosophical history is
necessary. Frege (cf. Frege 1892) developed a theory of meaning that distinguishes
between two components of meaning: sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung). The
sense of an expression consists of the conditions under which it obtains: if we call
an unmarried man a bachelor, then the concept ‘bachelor’ has as conditions: being
a man and being unmarried.
The presence of each of these conditions is necessary, and the presence of both
of these conditions is sufficient for a person to be a bachelor. The reference of an
expression consists of the set of all objects that fulfil the conditions that are part
of its sense: ‘bachelor’ refers to all unmarried men. The sense of an expression
determines its reference, and two expressions with the same sense have the same
reference. Meaning may change, i.e., for instance, the conditions that determine the
sense of a concept may change through time. This is sometimes referred to as the
‘open texture’ of a concept.
The open-texture nature of legal concepts can be more precisely defined as
the possibility that elements of the definition of some concept may change, may
be left out, or may be added at some point in time, from which point in time
the new set of elements will constitute the definition of that concept. In other
words: the sense of an open texture concept changes through time. The concept
of open texture is not a purely legal phenomenon. It was introduced by Waismann
(1952, p. 120), who distinguishes between open texture and vagueness of empiri-
cal concepts. If we consider vagueness to be the unclear (or missing) demarcation
lines of application of a concept, then open texture can be defined as the pos-
sibility of vagueness. Vagueness may apply to both the intension (sense) of a
concept, in which case there is no (clear) set of necessary and sufficient appli-
cation conditions for the concept, and to the extension (reference) of a concept,
in which case we cannot (completely) determine the set of objects the concept
refers to.
The view of meaning as use, introduced by Wittgenstein (cf. Wittgenstein 1953),
always is subject to the danger of becoming a slogan rather than a serious idea. It has
to be more strictly defined (or rather, explained by examples, as Wittgenstein did)
to make sense, because otherwise, it raises questions such as: whose use constitutes
meaning? and: what kinds of use constitute meaning? Putnam (1975, p. 145) has an
approach that may clarify the ‘use’ aspect of meaning:
268 L. Mommers
[E]veryone to whom gold is important for any reason has to acquire the word ‘gold’; but he
does not have to acquire the method of recognizing if something is or is not gold. He can
rely on a special subclass of speakers. The features that are generally thought to be present
in connection with a general name – necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in
the extension, ways of recognizing if something is in the extension (‘criteria’), etc. – are all
present in the linguistic community considered as a collective body; but that collective body
divides the ‘labor’ of knowing and employing these various parts of the ‘meaning’ of ‘gold.
The question whose use constitutes meaning becomes acute when only a small
part of the community is able to determine whether some substance is really gold.
Is only their use of the term ‘gold’ relevant? The majority of people, who do not
distinguish gold from many other substances that look like gold, use the term ‘gold’
in a way that makes it impossible to determine its reference. Should we then exclude
reference from our understanding of meaning?
Any definition of meaning that is related to use yields such problems. In the
determination of the meaning of ‘meaning’ we can employ the approaches to the
concept itself. For an intensional approach, this would mean that we can define the
meaning of ‘meaning’ in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. As ‘meaning’
itself is an open-textured concept, we need to consider the possibility of changes in
this set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Meaning regarded as use also enables
us to integrate open-texturedness into the concept of meaning. Because the use of
the concept of meaning varies through time and through communities, we should
incorporate use in its definition. The meaning of ‘meaning’ thus becomes dependent
on the actual occurrence of the concept in natural language use, or, more specifically,
in the legal domain, or even in the domain of the employment of legal information
systems. The concept of meaning forms the core of legal ontologies: any ontology
that does not take into account the peculiarities of legal meaning – the meandering
of legal meaning between fixed criteria ensuring legal certainty and open texture
enabling proper responses to unforeseen situations and unfair consequences – will
render itself useless in little time.
12.2 A Selection of Legal Ontologies
Despite the name ‘ontology’, legal ontologies are actually quite different in their
approach to legal domains. For clarification purposes, I distinguish between three
different approaches. Semantically oriented approaches focus on the semantic
interpretation of a representation of elements and relations in a certain domain.
Epistemically oriented approaches focus on the (acquisition of) knowledge in a
domain. Ontologically oriented approaches stress the entities and relations that con-
stitute a domain. It goes without saying that these approaches tend to overlap to a
certain extent with respect to their semantic, epistemic and ontological claims. Still,
the distinction helps to classify ontologies on the basis of their assumed relation
to reality: through the relation between language and reality (semantics), between
knowledge and reality (epistemology) or through claims regarding existence (ontol-
ogy). What the examples below have in common, is that they are based on a
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top–down approach, starting from very abstract concepts, and trying to apply these
on concrete domains. There is one notable exception to this: the LOIS WordNet,
which can be considered as a (lexical) ontology, was partly built from the viewpoint
of individual legal concepts. The bottom–up approach, however, seems promising,
and is further discussed in Section 12.4.
12.2.1 Semantically Oriented Theories
Many logical languages used in AI & law tend to make ontological assumptions if
their syntax and semantics are deemed to be representative of certain legal classes.
Deontic logics that distinguish between different types of norms make such underly-
ing assumptions as well – unless any relation between the logic and the ‘real world’
is denied. An example of a semantically oriented theory is McCarty’s Language
of Legal Discourse. It is both a semantic and an ontological framework. The cat-
egories that McCarty distinguishes in one of his articles about LLD are space,
time, mass, action, permission, obligation, causation, purpose, intention, knowl-
edge, belief (McCarty 1989, p. 180). These categories give a clear indication of
the common-sense character McCarty ascribes to the legal domain: there is little
attention for its typically legal characteristics.
A different, less formal (in terms of lacking a formal semantics) approach is
found in applications of WordNet in the legal domain. WordNet is a framework of
relations between concepts. In WordNet, concepts are represented by a set of syn-
onyms (synset) with an accompanying explanation of its meaning. These synsets are
linked to each other by a fixed set of relations that are part of the WordNet frame-
work (Fellbaum 1998). These include causality and specificity. JurWordNet is an
extension of a generic Italian WordNet that contains legal terms and their meanings,
linked up to the generic WordNet (cf. Gangemi et al. 2003). The LOIS WordNet
is a legal WordNet for six European languages that is partly based on JurWordNet
and contains around 5,000 legal concepts per language (cf. Dini et al. 20055). These
WordNets enable, for instance, linking layman’s search terms with the legal pro-
fessional’s language, thereby enabling search actions in legal documents without
the need to know legal terminology beforehand. As WordNet is such a widespread
semantic framework, it enables linking up legal WordNets to the generic ontologies
that have been modelled in WordNet.
12.2.2 Epistemically Oriented Theories
Epistemically oriented theories contain claims on knowledge of the legal domain.
As the law is generally regarded – at least partly – a human-constructed phe-
nomenon, it makes sense to approach it from the viewpoint of knowledge: it consists
largely of agreements between people; it is not tangible, and thus, it resides ‘in
the head’ for the better part. A clear example of an epistemically oriented the-
ory is Valente’s (1995) ‘functional ontology’. It models an ontology of law from
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the perspectives of both information science, following the definition of ‘ontol-
ogy’ given by Gruber, and of legal theory, following such legal theorists as Kelsen
and Hart. The functional ontology distinguishes between six different basic types
of knowledge: normative knowledge, meta-legal knowledge, world knowledge,
responsibility knowledge, reactive knowledge, and creative knowledge.
Normative knowledge is regarded the most obvious kind of legal knowledge. It
consists of the elements of the legal domain prescribing the behaviour of the peo-
ple constituting a society, and a description of the way social reality should look.
Meta-legal knowledge consists of the entities not directly regulating behaviour.
These entities are empowering and derogating norms, and norms regulating the
mutual relations among primary norms. World knowledge consists of elements
telling us what the world looks like. Responsibility knowledge consists of the
knowledge that links normative knowledge to reactive knowledge: in case some
agent causes a certain event, responsibility knowledge helps to establish the extent
to which the agent can be held responsible for what he did. Reactive knowl-
edge consists of the sanctions imposed if an agent breaches a norm and is held
responsible for that. Creative knowledge, finally, consists of information about
newly created institutions and other entities that arise from the application of
the law.
12.2.3 Ontologically Oriented Theories
Ontologically oriented theories make claims about reality. Such a theory will, for
instance, make a claim about the existence of individual norms. Ontologically ori-
ented theories will be the most ‘ontological’ from a philosophical viewpoint: they
make implicit or explicit claims about existence.
An early ontologically oriented theory was that of Van Kralingen ‘frame based
ontology’ (1995). He distinguishes between three main types of entities: acts, norms
and concepts. For representation purposes, each of these entity types is represented
by a so-called frame, each containing a number of slots filled with characteristics of
a specific occurrence of the entity. An act frame consists of fourteen elements: an act
identifier, promulgation, scope, agent, act type, means, manner, temporal aspects,
spatial aspects, circumstances, cause, aim, intentionality, and final state. The slots of
a norm frame are a norm identifier, promulgation, scope, conditions of application,
subject, legal modality, and an act identifier. The third type of frame, concept frames,
consists of a concept, concept type, priority, promulgation, scope, conditions, and
instances. Concept types distinguished are definitions, deeming provisions, factors
or meta-concepts.
Verheij and Hage (1997) developed a model consisting of three main elements:
states-of-affairs, events, and rules. States-of-affairs are (possible or real) situations
that can be described by descriptive sentences. Events bring about changes in the
current states-of-affairs. Rules express direct relations among states-of-affairs. Thus,
there are two different relations among states-of-affairs: either the transition from
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one state-of-affairs into another is caused by an event, or the transition from one
state-of-affairs into another is the result of the application of a rule, which makes
the former constitute the latter. The model is inspired by institutional theories of law.
By accommodating the temporal aspects of relations between states-of-affairs and
events, the supervenience relation between states-of-affairs, and the different modal-
ities of states-of-affairs, the authors introduce a very abstract approach towards
modelling legal phenomena.
LRI-Core, developed by, among others, Breuker and Winkels (2003) is a core
ontology specifically aimed at the legal domain, but with a clear connection to
the physical world. The main entity classes distinguished in the physical world
are objects (e.g., documents) and processes (e.g., actions). Mental objects and pro-
cesses often relate to the physical world. Social organization is attained by imposing
roles on agents, partly regulated by (legal) norms. It has been used as top-ontology
in several practice-related projects, such as the CLIME project (Winkels et al.
1998), in which a question–answerring system was based on an ontology-oriented
representation of a certain domain.
12.2.4 Mixed Approaches
Mommers’ (2002) ‘knowledge-based ontology of law’ focuses merely on the ambi-
guous perspective that one can have on legal domains. By distinguishing between
ontological status layers and empistemic roles, he accommodates both the epistemic
and the ontological viewpoint in a single ontology. Although the author includes
some semantically oriented categories (sentences, statements) in his ontology, the
main focus is on accommodating views on the existence of legal systems and their
constituents, and knowledge of the law. Ontological status layers are efficacy (the
degree to which a law has the intended effect), validity (has a law been issued by the
proper authorities in a proper way) and recognition (has a law been recognized as a
law by its addressee). They each reflect, for instance, a view on the existence of legal
rules. An epistemic role is a role that an entity (a belief, a statement) can take in the
acquisition or justification of knowledge. Epistemic roles include reasons, defeaters
(‘arguments’ that attack a reason or a relation between a reason and a conclusion)
and knowledge. By including such epistemic roles, there is also a clear place for
legal argumentation in the ontology.
12.3 Applications of Legal Ontologies
Applications of legal ontologies range from information systems to knowledge-
based systems. The more ‘intelligence’ is requested from a system, the more detailed
knowledge representation the ontology should support. Examples of applications of
legal ontologies are:
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(a) Information retrieval. By encoding knowledge about the meaning of concepts
and the relations among them, it becomes possible to empower users of infor-
mation retrieval systems. A seminal version of an ontology, a thesaurus, can
encode relations between terms and concepts, for instance hierarchical rela-
tions. Information about less and more specific concepts can help the user to
find information relevant to his query. Examples of relevant publications and
projects are Matthijssen (1999), who introduces an interface between the lay
user and a legal database, LOIS (which stands for ‘Lexical Ontologies for legal
Information Sharing’, cf. Dini et al. 2005) and BEST (which stands for ‘Batna
Establishment using Semantic web Technology’, cf. Van Laarschot et al. 2005).
(b) Translation of legal documents. Making explicit the meaning of legal terms
can help in (manually!) translating legal documents from one language into
another one. A framework for this specific purpose has been developed
by Termorshuizen-Arts (2003). Although her work was not done from the
perspective of artificial intelligence & law, it is certainly relevant to that
discipline.
(c) Automated classification and summarizing. Parallel to information retrieval,
automated classification is meant to facilitate finding documents. Ontologies,
combined with statistic techniques and natural language processing techniques,
can support classification techniques as well. The same goes for making
summaries of documents automatically (cf. Moens et al. 1997, Moens 2004).
(d) Question answering. Automatic question answering requires thorough repre-
sentation of knowledge in order to let a system ‘understand’ both a question
and the sources of knowledge on which to base automatic answering. Cf.,
e.g., the CLIME project. CLIME stands for ‘Computerised Legal Information
Management and Explanation’, cf. Winkels et al. (1998).
(e) Decision support and decision making. Legal (procedural) regulations often
contain decision structures that allow making certain decisions or qualifications.
Although such structures can be modelled in relatively simple decision trees,
such decision trees still require user intervention on making a choice in each
step. An ontology can be used to encode not only the decision steps, but also
the contents of the decision rules. Advantages of using an ontology in such a
case are supposed to include consistency of the modeling activity result and the
re-usability of the underlying ontology for other modeling activities. Although
the models underlying case-based systems are seldom called ‘ontologies’, they
can be regarded as such. The model underlying a sentencing system described
in Oskamp (1998) is just one example of this. It contains a model with two main
constituents: facts and factors. Factors are subjective qualifications of (sets of)
objective facts. By the nature of these entities, they constitute an ‘ontology’ of
the arguments underlying sentencing decisions.
(f) Agent technology. Although still largely a theoretical exercise, agents are
assumed to allow for intelligent autonomous communication between different
computer systems. For such communication, the modelling of rules governing
that communication is necessary. As in the case of decision support and decision
making, such modelling can be supported by an underlying ontology. Potential
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practical applications of agents in the legal domain are automated dispute reso-
lution by negotiation and the controlled exchange of sensitive data, for instance
in electronic legal dossiers
Of these different applications of ontologies, information retrieval still remains
the most widely found application of ontologies – especially if we count those
frameworks that are regularly not called ontologies, such as thesauri. In this respect,
the legal domain does not really differ from many other domains.
12.4 New Developments
Large-scale information systems and knowledge-based systems have stimulated the
development of ontologies in recent years. Unlike the earlier top–down approach
towards ontology construction seen in the discussions in Section 12.2, a bottom–up
approach towards the generation of ontologies has gained attention, by following the
structure of legal sources themselves. The result of generating such a model can be
coined a ‘bottom–up ontology’. The development of interactive internet applications
has triggered the generation of ‘folksonomies’: classification schemes that are the
result of the joint participation of many users. This development will play a grow-
ing role in the legal domain. For instance, Wikipedia (the internet encyclopaedia;
cf. www.wikipedia.org) currently contains many legal entries, and the references
between these entries indicate a structure. The same will be seen for Jurispedia – a
legal variant of Wikipedia.
How the process of bottom–up construction of ontologies can be best facilitated,
is largely unknown. Most platforms that could support such construction are still
in their infancy – policies for the proper use of on-line collaborative environments
(such as wikis, enabling the joint production of texts) are subject of trial and error
in their actual use. Use of such platforms in the legal domain is still quite rare, so
little is known about suitable policies for collaboration among lawyers. Still, this
bottom–up approach could be very promising as it involves domain specialists to a
much higher degree, putting more specialist knowledge into legal ontologies.
As a response to top–down, legal-theoretically oriented ontology building, more
pragmatic and positivist approaches have been developed. From the viewpoint that
general classification schemes will always be largely normative in nature, the aware-
ness arose that the most important basis for ontologies can be found in formal
sources of law: in legislation, case law etc. This insight was used in the LOIS
project, in which roughly half of the multi-lingual WordNet is constituted by con-
cepts directly derived from definitions in European directives (cf. Dini et al. 2005,
Mommers and Voermans 2005). A similar approach was suggested in Després and
Szulman (2005).
Folksonomies are classification schemes developed on the basis of user interac-
tion. They have become widely known through services such as FlickR.com, that
enable users to classify, for example, their own photos with self-selected ‘labels’. A
more or less coherent system or taxonomy of labels can thus come into existence.
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The opportunities offered by folksonomies are especially interesting with respect
to information retrieval. Current legal information systems are often either based
on full-text retrieval, statistic-based retrieval, or thesaurus-based retrieval. Full-text
retrieval does not offer meaningful connections with synonyms or related terms.
Statistics-based information retrieval generally provides only access to documents
with ‘associated’ terms, which makes these less reliable than search engines based
on thesauri or ontologies, the latter providing more rigid connections between
concepts.
Thesaurus-based retrieval is based on a pre-built thesaurus, which includes the
views of the builders on the legal domains included. This view can clash with the
users’ expectations of synonymy and related terms. It would be interesting to see the
type of user-initiated classification schemes applied in legal information retrieval.
Little work has been done on this matter in the legal domain. A somewhat related
attempt to model user interaction in the quality assessment of legal documents and
legal institutions is found in Mommers (2003) and (2005). A collaborative approach
of legal knowledge dissemination is found in Hoorn (2005). A more complex col-
laborative approach would allow for establishing, for instance, WordNet relations
between different items.
12.5 Conclusion
Although a considerable number of legal ontologies has been developed in the past
two decades, there are still few large-scale applications. Apart from an apparent
lack of dissemination activities by the AI & Law community in the legal domain,
this could be attributed to the gap between the state-of-the-art in AI & Law and
the situation in legal publishing, one of the main (potential) users of legal ontolo-
gies. It seems that the more profound type of modeling in legal ontologies is still
too advanced for legal information retrieval, in which traditional taxonomies, the-
sauri and keyword lists are still prevalent. Additionally, an important cause for a
lack of ‘deep’ modeling can be found in the enormous effort that has to be made
for it.
Also, there is a tendency in AI & Law to build generic models that do not
really fit in with large parts of the legal domain, which in itself is very complex
and diverse, and thereby very hard to classify. A bottom–up approach is seldom
found, which is a pity, because it could yield very interesting insights in the nature
of legal concepts: how they can be defined, how they relate to common-sense
concepts (if they do), and what legal relations there are among legal concepts.
The most important development in this respect comes, in my opinion, from out-
side AI & law. Folksonomies and on-line collaborative environments create great
opportunities in distributing the modelling effort needed for large-scale ontology-
based legal information systems among many persons. All kinds of incentives
(for instance, reputational rewards) could be used in order to unleash the mas-
sive knowledge present in the population of lawyers in order to build semantic
networks.
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